Though the Royal Council had long been central as working bodies that represented the Crown, certain offices and leaders were promoted and others were let go. They had advised on appointments and acted as 'a supreme court of justice and supervised local Castilian governments'. These were reduced to a dozen or so roles dependent on royal prerogative. A prelate, three caballeros and eight or nine jurists (letrados) would do the work of all the rest. Others might come to meetings but would not be allowed to decide matters.
"This exclusion of the great magnates from voting on matters of state meant that the traditional offices of some of the proudest families of Castile were transformed into empty dignities. The Velascos continued to be Constables of Castile, the Enriquez Admirals of Castile, but their high-sounding titles ceased to give them a proscriptive right to the exercise of political power."Instead, 'new men' were promoted and the old, well established bureaucracy was left to drift. People of university learning were established as secretaries who acted as scribes detailing communications and remained dependent on the workings of the Council's activities. It hadn't always been that way. [p.90]
The Consejo had previously been remade under different circumstances in the 1300's due to the same sort of expansions of magnate control and power, with much of that falling to local regidores acting as municipal administrators. Based on the model in Burgos, as Elliott tells us, there were six alcaldes or judges with judicial duties and sixteen regidores who operated a sort of closed oligarchy. In city after city in Castile, more and more municipalities expanded on this model of civic office-holding with corregidors, royally chosen representatives to influence these municipal affairs with royal input. But the Crown lost a lot of power thru the 1400's and this entire system needed to be reformed. As a result with the Cortes of Toledo in 1480, more of these corregidors took on more duties across Castile.
"The growth of venality, and the decline of royal control, left the field open for local magnates and competing factions to extend their influence over the organs of municipal government, so that towns were either bitterly divided by civil feuds, or fell into the hands of small, self-governing oligarchies." [p. 94].By the time Isabella had come to power these problems had become more important to quell, and once they were, new order had to be asserted. Hereditary grants of offices were revoked. New town halls were erected in many towns that had not had them before. Written records were to be kept of what transpired in all the places.New offices of these corregidors would be entrusted with administrative and judicial duties. These individuals were to be selected by Queen and King and they would work hard to choose the replacement figures from any place they saw fit. Not necessarily, Elliott warns, were these chosen from the lower classes, but at least, these selected were not limited to those former traditional noble families. So on the one hand there was a kind of greater inclusion from society at large, while simultaneously cutting out many of the old family namesakes.
In time the old alcaldes were replaced with temporary royal corregidores that acted as justices. By the mid 1500's in the reign of Phillip II there were 66 corregimientos in Castile. [p. 95] Similarly the economy of Castile and then greater Spain was effected. Independent revenues that came from sources other than the traditional Cortes was crucially important for the independent viability of the Crown and its continued well-being. Too often had the Crown of old required assistance from this or that municipality or this or that collection of royal representatives in order to carry out its goals. With greater diversity in revenue streams, of new and trusted eyes and voices out in the many towns and cities, in time, the sovereigns could extend their own control, bit by bit, becoming greater arbiters of power and their regal will. The process would expand over decades.
Earlier in their reign they found the Cortes useful in putting down rebellions and upstarts. By the time of the Cortes of 1480, and in the midst of the Reconquista program pushing out the older traditional forms of rule in many cities, the Crown also found it useful to promote their own trusted figures in doing so. The putting down of rebels, and muslims, of corrupt locals and puffed up magnates, coincided with an increase of wealth and wealth distribution in Castile. [p. 92] These benefits, including better record keeping and accurate informants, even firmer judicial decisions by trutsed appointees, all effectively swelled the coffers of the crown, allowing them to operate outside the decions of the limiting Cortes. In turn, more wealth led to a kind of virtuous cycle, in that it renewed attention to goals like the Conquest of Granada, and establishing greater influence in Italy, bringing more power to the Crown. [p. 93]
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J.H. Elliott: Imperial Spain 1469-1716 : Penguin, NY, 2002
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